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Cambodia: Phnom Penh has taken another step in its effort to deal with Viet Cong violations of Cambodia's borders.

In late February, Deputy Premier Son Sann called in Nguyen Van Hieu, the National Liberation Front's representative in Phnom Penh, and complained that the Viet Cong were smuggling rice and engaging in more sensitive activities in border areas. According to an official Cambodian account, Son Sann made it clear to Hieu that Cambodia feels it is under increasing pressure from the US over the sanctuary problem. Hieu was warned that "serious obstacles" might result if remedial measures are not taken.

Hieu's response was conciliatory. He admitted that there might have been cases when Viet Cong troops crossed the border in "error." In an apparent bid to demonstrate Front sincerity, Hieu asked for a list of Viet Cong violations so that they could be stopped.

The approach to the Front, on top of other recent measures to maintain greater control in border areas, is a clear sign that Cambodia is determined to take additional steps to keep the war from spilling over into its territory. Sihanouk probably hopes that the Vietnamese Communists can be persuaded to exercise greater restraint in using Cambodian territory. His leverage is limited, however, in that Cambodia does not have the military strength to force the Communists from its territory. In addition, Sihanouk wants to maintain at least a facade of cordial relations with those elements he believes will eventually control South Vietnam.

For their part, the Communists will probably try, as they have in the past, to keep their activity in Cambodia as unobtrusive as possible. Their policy, however, will be determined more by the military requirements in South Vietnam than by concern over Sihanouk's reaction.

*Poland: Gomulka's speech yesterday suggested that he has paid a stiff price to party hardliners in return for an uncertain stability.

According to an official summary of the speech, the Polish party leader said the party is not anti-Semitic, only anti-Zionist, and demanded that Jews who "consider Israel to be their fatherland" emigrate, promising visas.

Gomulka charged before 3,000 activists in Warsaw that the instigators of the student demonstrations of the past 11 days are anti-Soviet. He re-stated his dictum of October 1956--that the choice for Poland is between "socialism and reaction, between a policy insuring Poland's frontiers and a road leading to disaster." His emphasis on the nationalist sentiment underlying the latest unrest reflected Gomulka's awareness of the lack of favor accorded his policy of a firm Polish-Soviet alliance.

Gomulka largely absolved a majority of the student demonstrators from blame, and he attempted, unconvincingly, to demonstrate their ideological unity with the workers behind his regime. He scored a "small group" of the Warsaw University faculty for the disturbances. This, together with his assertion that the regime had been "reluctant" to "interfere" in the universities, suggests some new attempt to control students through the university administrators.

Turning to the political crisis generated by the riots, Gomulka sidestepped endorsement of demands in the party press for a "speedy punishment." He called for careful "explanations, analysis, and criticism" before any action against the "reactionary ulcer" revealed by recent developments.

Gomulka made no concessions. He said that some of the students' demands for "democracy and freedom of expression" require "more detailed study," in effect postponing any move to alleviate disaffection. Although

Gomulka was explicit that some in the lower echelons of the party and government are to be purged in the near future, he repeatedly stressed that more significant decisions--presumably those affecting the top leadership--await the party congress during the latter part of this year.

By postponing major moves, Gomulka may gain time to re-establish a modicum of party unity, and to rid himself of both his "revisionist" and "Stalinist" opponents who represent extreme wings of the party. It is clear, however, that his position has been weakened.

In attempting to remake a stable regime he will have to strike compromises. On the one hand, he will be forced to rely heavily on the support of the hardline "Partisan" faction of the party, which espouses a rigid authoritarianism tailored to Polish conditions. On the other hand, Gomulka will also need to exercise enough restraint to forestall new eruptions from disaffected youth and intellectuals.

Czechoslovakia - East Germany: Relations between the two countries, never really cordial even in Novotny's time, appear to be deteriorating.

Pankow has scarcely disguised its hostility to the "democratization process" going on in Prague and its fear that Czechoslovakia will draw closer to West Germany. East German commentary has been selective, tendentious, and misleading, presumably in an effort to prevent the "infection" from spreading over the frontier.

The Czechoslovaks have reacted by charging that such reporting only prolongs the struggle of the conservatives against the new leadership. Prague radio has ridiculed an East German newspaper's assertion that Czechoslovak developments were "the work of Western imperialists."

On 17 March, the main Czechoslovak party paper, Rude Pravo, published the texts of telegrams exchanged by Czechoslovak and East German leaders on the occasion of the first anniversary of a bilateral friendship treaty. Czechoslovak party boss Dubcek's message failed to respond to Ulbricht's characterization of the treaty as a "decisive means" of "repulsing" West German expansionism. Foreign Minister David, a Novotny man, has, however, maintained the same hard line against Bonn that he has upheld for years.

Prague intends to pursue a policy of gradual enhancement of its European relations, particularly those with West Germany, despite East German objections. In a major speech on 16 March, for example, Dubcek spoke of restoring traditional relations with Europe, while maintaining his basic alliances in the Communist world.

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The West German Government, for its part, has cautiously refrained from expressing views on developments in Czechoslovakia, in order that such views may not be used against the liberals. Chancellor Kiesinger, however, reportedly has asked Christian Democratic Union secretary general Bruno Heck to make an unofficial "exploratory" visit to Czechoslovakia. The visit would be similar to the one Heck made to Yugoslavia last August before negotiations were begun on a resumption of diplomatic relations. Heck hopes to make this trip in May or June.

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